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The purpose of this research is to identify potential challenges 
encountered by the Government of Indonesia (GOI), informal sector 
workers, and the local government due to a newly-adopted health 
care scheme “health for all” or Universal Health Coverage (UHC). 
The health care scheme aims to integrate the previously fragmented 
formal social protection programs, either the programs run by four 
state-owned enterprises or local governments into a single national 
health care program. The program is known as National Health 
Care Insurance or Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN). There is 
only one public entity called Social Security Administrative Body 
or Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (BPJS Kesehatan) that has 
the sole authority on managing the implementation of JKN. JKN is 
already targeting to provide health care universalism for the entire 
Indonesian population via Social Health Insurance (SHI) within five 
years between 2014 and 2019, a very ambitious target considering 
	
that Indonesia is the fourth most populous country and the largest 
archipelago country in the world, with a strong tendency toward 
decentralization and predominantly inhabited by informal sector 
workers. 
Indonesia’s decentralization policy has helped diversify and 
further mature the UHC scheme at the regional level prior to 
implementing JKN. This has become a source of tension between 
the central and local governments since some local governments 
have been reluctant to integrate their own version of regional health 
insurance known as Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah (JAMKESDA) 
into JKN. JKN adopts SHI as the health care funding mechanism to 
finance the program. It requires a compulsory membership for all 
people in Indonesia and a compulsory contribution based on the 
income level of each individual. This poses challenges for the 
informal sector workers who make up a predominant percentage of 
Indonesia’s total labor force. Such workers are mostly involved in 
industries such as agriculture, fishery, hunting and forestry. 
In order to identify the possible challenges, this research has 
conducted an analysis based on the “six facilitating factors” by 
Carrin and James (2005). They argue that the six facilitating factors 
are key to speeding up the transition toward UHC via SHI. By 
	
analyzing the six facilitating factors in the context of Indonesia, it 
has been found that the “government stewardship” factor is most 
critical to solving issues such as the mounting deficit of BPJS 
Kesehatan which continues to rise each year. Hopefully, this 
research may be further developed in the future by focusing on the 
process of JAMKESDA’s integration into JKN. 
Keywords: Indonesia, Universal Health Coverage, Social Health 
Insurance, the Government of Indonesia, Informal Sector 
Workers, Local Government. 
Student ID: 2014-23731 
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The term ‘transformation’ has been strongly emphasized in the 
context of social protection development in Indonesia. It refers to a rapid 
change in the sets of social policy as a response to the political-economic 
situation post-the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997-1998. This 
research begins with brief historical background of social welfare regime 
in Indonesia during the preceding years before National Social Security 
System or Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional (SJSN) in 2004.  
  Moreover, this research focuses on the latter years after SJSN to 
present specifically during the implementation of National Health 
Insurance or Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN). JKN replaced major 
health care programs run by the Government of Indonesia (GOI), either it 
is the central government or the regional government by establishing 
Social Security Administrative Body for Health or Badan Penyelenggara 
Jaminan Sosial (BPJS Kesehatan). At least for now, BPJS Kesehatan is 
the largest single-payer while JKN sets a pretty massive ambitious goal, 
achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC) within the range of five 
years (2014-2019).  
Meanwhile, by clustering the research questions into three parts, this 
research strives to posit the potential challenges encountered by the GOI, 
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the informal sector workers and the local government during this 
transition phase. 
 
1.1 Historical Background 
 When Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, The Preamble of 
The 1945 Constitutions of the Republic of Indonesia has been the 
fundamental structure to perceive the national aspirations of the citizen, as 
follows: 
“Indonesia’s National Independence shall be enshrined in the Constitution of the State of 
the Republic of Indonesia, established within the structure of the State of the Republic of 
Indonesia with sovereignty of the people based upon Belief in the One and Only God, 
just and civilized Humanity, the Unity of Indonesia, and the Democracy guided by the 
inner wisdom of Deliberations amongst Representatives, and by creating social Justice 
for the entire people of Indonesia.” (GOI, Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of 
Indonesia).  
 
The last sentence stipulates that the GOI is the prime mover in providing 
social justice for all Indonesian citizens, it took fifty-nine years later, in 
2004, nonetheless. This implies that the concern of the GOI with social 
welfare development is vis-à-vis to current state of economy and political-
economic at the time thus, there are three vital timeline: (1). Old Order 
regime (1945-1966); (2). New Order regime (1966-1998); (3). Post-AFC 
from 1997-1998 to the present (Sumarto, 2017). However, it is also 
important to highlight that the development of social protection programs 
in Indonesia has been heavily relaying on informal social protection 
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provisions, such as: family-based or community-based social protection. 
While the formal social protection programs usually set up for particular 
group of population and it covered only less than 10 per cent of total more 
than 250 million out of Indonesian population prior to 2014, that marked 
the first year of SJSN actualizes via BPJS Kesehatan. 
 Even after the Proclamation of the Indonesian Independence in 1945, 
Soekarno and Indonesian people had to continue struggling and surviving 
periods of warfare against the Dutch, the United Kingdom and Japan. 
Major government budget was spent for military-related affairs (Booth, 
2010). At the same time, the GOI also had to rebuild the war-torn country 
from the scratch, with the large debt from the Netherland Indies. Thus, the 
government budget allocated mainly to military-related affairs and to 
rebuild the country as the aftermath of centuries of colonization that 
ended by revolutionary wars.  It was a devastated period for all aspects of 
development in Indonesia, including a ruined health care system 
(Neelakantan, 2014). The provision of health care infrastructures was less 
than sufficient. On the one hand, Soekarno had put effort to initiate formal 
social protection programs though, the target exclusively aimed for formal 
workers, both in public and private sectors. By the end of Soekarno’s 
administration, the economy of Indonesia was in severe turmoil due to the 
hyperinflation.  
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 The beginning years of Soeharto’s incumbent, known as New Order 
regime (1966-1998), labeled Indonesia as ‘the East Asian Miracle’ and 
‘newly industrializing economies’ because Soeharto was able to turn the 
depressing hyperinflation from 636 percent in 1966 to 9 percent in 1970 
(Sumarto, 2017). In order to boost the economic development in 
Indonesia, Soeharto opened the foreign investment for the first time. In 
fact, the injection of the new policy contributed to the rapid 
industrialization in Indonesia. The situation affected the increasing 
number of job opportunity. Since more people joined the active 
workforce, the GOI assessed the formal social protection programs that 
previously initiated during Soekarno’s era. During the period of 
Soeharto’s presidency, the only significant alternation was the 
establishment of four state-owned enterprises that managed social 
protection programs and the expansion of health care and pension 
coverage for civil servants, police and army members and private sector 
workers. For the civil servants, the health care insurance was Health 
Insurance or Asuransi Kesehatan (ASKES) while for the pension program 
was Savings and Insurance for Pension or Tabungan dan Asuransi 
Pensiun (TASPEN). The police and army members are registered for 
Social Insurance for Indonesian Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia or Asuransi Sosial Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia 
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(ASABRI). Due to enormous economic growth and economic 
development, this era introduced the generosity of fuel-subsidy. To 
present, the fuel-subsidy is widely enjoyed by almost all the Indonesian 
population. In other words, there have been no standardized-criteria to 
assess the eligibility of the recipients which then causes great burden to 
the government budget.  
 The New Order regime collapsed when the Asian Financial Crisis 
(AFC) hit Indonesia in 1998. The AFC might be illustrated as an 
emergency call to the inactive motion of social protection development in 
Indonesia. The AFC had triggered the evolution of Indonesia’s social 
security system, shifting from a fragmented system into a single 
comprehensive system. The reason was, that in the aftermath of the AFC, 
was the increasing national poverty rate from 15 percent in mid-1997 to 
33 percent by the end of 1998. The falling of real wages combined with 
the skyrocketing price of domestic necessities by 78 percent were the 
major causalities that pushed approximately 36 million people into 
absolute poverty (Sumarto and Bazzi, 2011). In the wake of the crisis, the 
GOI launched Social Safety Net Program or Jaring Pengaman Sosial 
(JPS) specifically to prevent more people fell into absolute poverty. Social 
Safety Net (SSN) programs started to dominate the social security system 
in Indonesia since then. Moreover, the AFC had been also deemed as a 
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trigger of political transition of Indonesia. The transition was set in 
motion after the collapse of 32 years of military-led authoritarianism. This 
transition period has been titled as Era Reformasi. Era Reformasi 
generates massive alteration on political system of Indonesia, including 
handing over some degrees of authority from the central government to 
local governments the so-called decentralization. 
In summary, given the background on Indonesia’s social security 
prior 2004 was fragmented and targeted only certain groups of the 
population, public sector workers, members of the military along with 
their dependents and the formal sector workers in large firms. The 
development of social security was also slow-paced. A critical juncture 
that triggered a pivotal advancement in social security in Indonesia was 
the AFC in 1997-1998. On a different note, as for the country in which 
the government allocated fuel subsidies over 20 percent of total 
government expenditure in mid-2000s, albeit it has been gradually cut-off 
ever since, this declares Indonesia as a generous subsidized-energy 
provider to its citizen (ADB, 2015). Thus it was not without reason that 
the concern about stagnant development on social protection kept 
experiencing delay especially anterior to the AFC.   
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1.2 Research Background 
More than thirty countries, including Indonesia, have adopted the 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) scheme. Countries like Thailand, 
Rwanda and Mexico prove that UHC is not a ‘pipedream’ for developing 
countries by demonstrating improving health outcomes and by providing 
health care access to their poorest population (Pablos-Mendez, et.al., 
2016). Recently, this inclusive healthcare has been mainly enhancing in 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). UHC strives to provide 
accessible yet affordable healthcare provisions to all the citizens. 
Likewise, the concept of UHC is in accordance with one of the national 
aspirations of Indonesia. Since it is mandated in the aforementioned last 
paragraph of The Preamble of The 1945 Constitutions of the Republic of 
Indonesia 
Dating back to October 19, 2004, under Megawati’s administration, 
the Law No.40/2004 on National Social Security System or Sistem 
Jaminan Sosial Nasional (SJSN) was enacted. The objective of SJSN is to 
establish a national system that guarantee all the population to be covered 
by an integrated social security scheme. As the follow-up of the SJSN 
Law, GOI regulated the establishment of a single public legal entity to 
implement social security programs for all the people in Indonesia, 
referred as Social Security Administrative Bodies or Badan 
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Penyelenggaraan Jaminan Sosial (BPJS). BPJS integrated four existing 
social security programs managed by state-owned enterprises and other 
social protection programs run by different ministries or institutions, 
either it is in the level of central or local governments. The legal basis of 
the establishment of BPJS is in accordance with the Law No.24/2011. 
BPJS functions within two programs, BPJS Kesehatan or BPJS for Health 
and BPJS Ketenagakerjaan or BPJS for Worker. However, the 
effectuation of BPJS Kesehatan is more crucial and critical. It is because 
BPJS Kesehatan has an obligation to support the objective of National 
Health Security or Jaminan Kesehatan National (JKN), providing access 
to health care service while protecting the population from financial harm. 
This objective is in accordance with the concept of UHC. JKN mandates a 
compulsory enrollment and compulsory contribution for all the 
population. According to the Ministry of Health of the Republic of 
Indonesia, JKN scheme adopts the concept Social Health Insurance (SHI) 
as the health care financing tool. JKN aims for a comprehensive benefit 
package with affordable cost, assuring quality control and cost control, 
sustainability in health care provision and portability in delivering health 
care service (GOI, 2013). JKN sets a main goal to reach UHC by 
providing coverage for all the population by 2019 whereas the program 
launched in 2014. It means that Indonesia is having five years to 
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accomplish the goal. Does the goal is too ambitious? Considering several 
aspects in health care-related provisions that are still less than sufficient. 
 
1.3 Problem Formulation and Research Questions  
Tracking Indonesia’s total health expenditure over the last two years, 
after BPJS Kesehatan has been operated since 2014, is still far below the 
global standard, 11.5 percent. In 2016, Indonesia’s total health 
expenditure was 5 percent even though, it was slightly increasing 
compared to the previous years (GOI, 2016). Hence, it might not overstate 
to describe that Indonesia is pretty ambitious towards achieving UHC by 
2019. Nonetheless, Indonesia has implemented the largest national social 
insurance to date moving to become the largest single-payer of UHC.  
The objective of aiming a target group of population for JKN 
program is to provide coverage for the non-poor informal sector workers 
who were the ‘missing middle’ (Dartanto, et al., 2016) or remain 
uncovered on the previous existing social insurance programs. Statistics 
Indonesia or Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) reported that in February 2017, 
the number of informal sector worker accounted for 58,5 percent which is 
still higher than the share of formal sector workers, amounting to 41,5 
percent. Based on vocation types, informal sectors are dominated by 
workers in agriculture, farm, forestry, hunting and fishery (GOI, 2017). 
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The average income of such workers is somehow considered low and 
unstable. In spite of that, the SHI scheme of JKN program also obliges the 
informal sector workers the mandatory enrollment by paying contribution 
on monthly basis. The insurance contribution is based on level of 
healthcare facility they choose to enroll.  
Moreover, another challenge in achieving UHC in Indonesia is to 
merge the existing local healthcare schemes, known as Regional Health 
Insurance or Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah (JAMKESDA) into JKN since 
the SJSN Law mostly focus on the transformation of JAMSOSTEK, 
TASPEN, ASABRI and ASKES. The rapid growing number on 
JAMKESDA is the result of decentralization policy in 1999. Article 11 
and paragraph 2 of the Law No. 22/1999 on Local Government regulated 
that healthcare is one of the “mandatory” functions of district/city 
government. However, the amendment of the Law on Local Government 
passed in 2004. Specifically the Law No. 32/2004, Article 13 and Article 
14 defined that the provincial government has the function to design, 
establish and develop their own healthcare system, which was later 
reaffirmed by the issuance of Decision of the Constitutional Court or 
Keputusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No.007/PUU-III/2005. As the 
implication, in 2011, 479 districts and cities out of 491 had implemented 
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or in the progress to implement their own local healthcare schemes 
(Fossati, 2017).  
This research attempts to analyze the future challenges in achieving 
UHC in Indonesia by 2019, given the specific objectives by putting 
forward the following research questions: 
1. What kind of challenges does the Government of Indonesia 
encounter in the process of achieving Universal Health Care 
coverage by 2019? 
2. What kind of challenges do informal sector workers face in the 
process of enrolling in BPJS Kesehatan? 
3. What kind of challenges does the local governments, both in 
the provincial and district/city level, meet toward integrating 














2.1. Demographic Profile  
Understanding Indonesia means noting some crucial physical facts of 
the country which affect the distribution of health service, human 
resources and healthcare infrastructure: 1). Indonesia is the largest 
archipelago country in the world, with 13,466 islands are registered with 
the valid coordinates on United Nations; 2). Those islands are scattered in 
1,913,578,68 square kilometers; 3). Indonesia is the fourth most populous 
country, accounting the increase number of population in 2016: 258,7 
million. During 2010-2016, the average growth rate of population 
accounted 1,36 percent (GOI, 2017).  
The issues of demographic in Indonesia, projecting between the time 
span from 2010 to 2030, has been shifted to these demographic mega 
trend, first is Indonesia’s large population will continue growing, 
accompanied with rapid urbanization. Second, Indonesia starts 
experiencing Demographic Dividend due to the positive outcome of the 
Family Planning Program. Thirdly, population situation will shift from 
mobility to non-permanent mobility (Salim, et. al, 2015). The drastic 
alteration in population structure will start post-2015.  
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Salim, et. al (2015) elaborates that working age population will be 
around 140 million with lower dependency ratio compared to decades 
ago, with 60 percent population living in urban areas. Recent data taken 
from Statistics Indonesia (GOI, 2017) shows, that the number labor force 
or economically active is 124,44 million.  The average income for formal 
sector worker per August 2016 is IDR 2,552,962 (USD 192.2), while for 
informal sector worker is IDR 1,496,430 (USD 119.6).  
Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fisheries still dominates the main 
industry in which the largest labor force or economically active people 
work, while the largest main employment status is owner assisted by 
temporary worker/unpaid worker. Even though the largest number of 
labor force and economically active people work in agriculture, forestry, 
hunting and fisheries, the highest average of net wage/salary per month 
for formal worker is in mining and quarrying industries: IDR 4,197,869 
(USD 316.1). As for informal worker, the highest salary per month is in 
services industry: IDR 1,825,984 (USD 137.5) (GOI, 2017). 
 
2.2. The Evolution of Social Protection in Indonesia 
This part elaborates the relevant literature on the evolution of social 
protection in Indonesia, placing more focus on the period between the 
AFC and the present period. Thereafter, the focus shifts into more specific 
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on how the evolution of social protection affects the informal sector 
workers and local healthcare schemes, JAMKESDA, managed by local 
governments.  
Since the Declaration of Independence in 1945, social protection 
schemes had no dynamic of expansion until the AFC weakened Indonesia. 
During the Dutch colonization, the social protection was one of the 
privileges owned only by public sector workers. A very minor amendment 
was passed in 1970, providing social protection program for a limited 
number of formal sector workers, mostly in large firms (Ramesh, 2014). 
Widjaja (2012) argues that the AFC in 1998 affected on how the concept 
of social protection evolves in Indonesia. Indonesia already adopted two 
concepts of social protection since then; social assistance and social 
security. He elaborates that although social security program was started 
earlier in 1960s, in fact, social protection scheme heavily relies on social 
assistance rather than social security in Indonesia. Social assistance was 
just first introduced in 1998, such as social safety nets and subsidies 
programs were widely implemented in the wake of the crisis. However 
most of social assistance programs are intended to smoothen consumption 
for the poor and the near-poor  (Widjaja, 2012).  
Social Safety Net Programs or Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS) was 
shortly introduced as an emergency tool to mitigate the negative impact of 
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the AFC. Referring to Sumarto and Bazzi (2011) and Widjaja (2012), the 
evolution of social protection is divided into two generations. The first 
generation of social protection programs were introduced during the 
period after the AFC, during Habibie’s administration until before 
Megawati’s administration enacted the SJSN Law in 2004. The social 
protection programs consisted of, as follows: 1). Food security. This was 
mostly in a form or targeted sales of subsidized rice, OPK and Rice for 
the Poor or Beras untuk Rakyat Miskin (RASKIN); 2). Health care 
subsidies, JPS health program; 3). School scholarships and block grants, 
JPS scholarship; 4). Work creation programs, JPS Padat Karya; 5). 
Community block grants, the programs focused to empower local 
communities, Kecamatan Development Program (PPK), Village 
Infrastructure Project or Instruksi Desa Tertinggal (IDT) and Regional 
Empowerment  to Overcome the Impact of Economic Crisis (PDM-DKE) 
(Sumarto and Bazzi, 2011; Widjaja, 2012). 
Furthermore, the second generation of social protection started in the 
late 2004 onward. In this generation, national social health insurance was 
introduced, as mandated by the SJSN Law. Nonetheless, social assistance 
programs were extended and comprehensively developed during 
Yudhoyono’s administration. The objectives of social protection during 
this period were expanded, not only mitigating the negative impact of the 
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financial crisis and poverty alleviation tool but also mitigating the 
negative impact of economic policy due to massive cut-off fuel subsidy in 
2005 (Katiman, 2012). In this second generation of social protection, 
Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCT) or Bantuan Langsung Sementara 
Masyarakat (BLSM) and Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) such as, 
Hope for the Family or Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) were 
introduced. While the other programs were Health Insurance for the Poor 
(ASKESKIN), school assistance programs such as, Poor Students Subsidy 
or Subsidi Siswa Miskin (SSM) and School Operational Subsidy or 
Bantuan Operasional Sekolah (BOS), also community program through 
National Program for Society Empowerment or Program Nasional 
Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM) (Widjaja, 2012).  
 
2.2.1. Informal Sector Worker 
Defining the target population of social protection programs in 
Indonesia, it either targets the poor and the near-poor or the formal sector 
workers, both from public sector and private sector (mostly in large 
firms), yet not to informal sector workers. Informal sector workers always 
account higher than formal sector workers on total number of labor 
workforce in Indonesia. Nevertheless, informal sector workers are mostly 
excluded from any social protection programs or also known as the 
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‘missing middle’. The term ‘missing middle’ refers to the non-poor 
informal sector workers who remain excluded from any social protection.  
The structure of the Indonesian economy has changed since 1970s. 
With the primary agriculture share in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
has fallen from 45 percent in 1970 to approximately 14 percent in 2014, 
shifting from agriculture-based economy to be more on manufacturing 
and services oriented (Rothernberg, et.al., 2016). In between the period 
of 1990 and 1996, the labor market marked its rapid transformation: 1. It 
had more formal sector workers than informal sector workers; 2. It 
moved from rural to urban; 3. Construction, manufacturing and services 
served as the primary sectors, replacing agriculture-related sector.  It 
was in 1998 due to the AFC, that brought the robust economic growth in 
a halt, resulted in a ‘sharp real wage contraction’, pushed the formal 
workers who got laid off to enter informal sectors and reversed the 
aforementioned rapid transformation (Feridhanusetyawan and Gaduh, 
2000).  
Even though the number of informal sector workers dominates the 
labor workforce in Indonesia, in fact, there was no comprehensive social 
protection program. The informal sector workers are not protected by 
workplace or company regulation and they do not pay income tax. In 
1995, the GOI launched Social Welfare Insurance Program or Asuransi 
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Kesejahteraan Sosial (ASKESOS), managed by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and community-based organizations (ILO, 2017). Sirojudin and 
Midgely (2011) state that ASKESOS was intended to provide social 
insurance for informal sector workers while accelerating poverty 
alleviation and promoting social development. The premium was 60 
cents USD on a monthly basis. The amount was based on the 
requirement that the worker must earn a minimum salary of 30 USD per 
month (ILO, 2017). The premium was relatively smaller, considering 
that the majority worked in agriculture and urban informal sector 
without sustain salary system (Sirojudin and Midgely, 2011). 
Non-poor informal groups should voluntarily self-enroll to the 
program because they are not eligible for premium subsidies. However 
due to several reasons, such as asymmetric information, lack of health 
services, lack of knowledge and income, they might not enthusiastically 
register to the JKN (Dartanto, et.al., 2016).  
Albeit the steps have been taken towards UHC since 2014, data by 
January 2016 showed that 15,080,000 out of 160,900,000 households 
with employment in informal sector already registered with JKN 
through BPJS Kesehatan. Thus the enrolment rate status poses a major 
obstacle to achieve UHC in 2019 (Dartanto, et al., 2016).  
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2.2.2. Local Healthcare Schemes 
During the New Order, local government had a limited resources and 
restricted contribution in health policy and healthcare provision. While 
local projects invested more focus on infrastructure development, there 
was low demand for healthcare service as well, with local people opted 
to traditional healing process (Achmad, 1999). It was until 1999, when 
decentralization, in granted substantial authority and allocated more 
power to the local government, districts in particular that encouraged 
policy experiment and innovation in health policy. The period after the 
enactment of decentralization law was signified by the emerging 
numbers of local healthcare schemes, known as Regional Health 
Insurance or Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah (JAMKESDA). Most of 
JAMKESDA schemes aim to provide free or highly-subsidized 
healthcare service to its residents, implying that the local governments 
already “laid out more ambitious plans to reach UHC within their 
jurisdiction” (Fossati, 2017).  He argues that JAMKESDA had triggered 
the central government to implement UHC scheme on the national 
policy level by putting the issue of equity to access healthcare service.  
Between the period from 2001 to 2012, the Ministry of Health 
recorded data of JAMKESDA schemes designed, funded and managed 
by the local governments in 352 municipalities/cities in 33 provinces. 
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The effort of the local governments had finally captured by the central 
government. In 2004, the newly appointed Minister of Health, Siti 
Fadilah Supari disclosed that the government would pay for inpatient 
services for all poor people in Indonesia, also known as Health 
Insurance for the Poor or Asuransi Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin 
(ASKESKIN). When ASKESKIN finally launched in 2005 as the first 
large-scale of national health insurance program, the program 
highlighted the first milestone towards a comprehensive UHC scheme in 
Indonesia (Fossati, 2017; Sparrow, Suryahadi and Widyanti, 2013). 
While some local governments argued that the launching of ASKESKIN 
was the reaction of the existing JAMKESDA (Fossati, 2017), on the one 
hand, this issue shook the very core of the power relationship that just 
set up due to the decentralization policy. Insiders claimed that her 
movement was an attempt to cover a deliberate move to re-consolidate 
the power at the center (Pisani, et.al., 2016). Thus, it angered some 
districts that already successfully run their own health schemes 
(Arifianto, et.al., 2005).  
The SJSN Law affirms the role of local government based on judicial 
review, granted by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Indonesia. As the follow up, the Law No.32/2004 on Local Government: 
Article 22 Alphabet H and Article 167 regulate the local governments 
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are obliged to prioritize their regional expenditures to develop their own 
local health schemes. After the BPJS Law was legislated in 2011, the 
GOI formulated a national roadmap towards achieving UHC. The 
national roadmap signifies that the integration from JAMKESDA to 
JKN should be executed (Supriyantoro, 2014). He perceives that the 
integration process is a challenge due to huge diversity of JAMKESDA 
schemes, applied by the provincial governments and district/city 
governments. His research analyses the challenge of integration from 
JAMKESDA to JKN is to synchronize administrative management, 
benefit packages and target recipients of Penerima Bantuan Iuran (PBI) 
for the poor and non-poor people.  
In Indonesia, decentralization law sharpens the inequity in health care 
funding and health provision, specifically in district/city government. 
Health care provision is more widely determined by district 
government’s revenue than population needs thus, the inequity at district 
level affects inequity at the individual level. Even so the solution 
mandated by the Ministry of Health is that local governments must 
provide a minimum package of services or Standar Pelayanan Minimal 
(SPM) (Ensor, et. Al, 2012). SPM focuses to provide health care service 
on maternal and neonatal care, infant and child care, family planning 
and priority communicable disease 
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CHAPTER 3 




3.1 Theoretical Framework of Social Health Insurance (SHI) 
The development of permanent health system in which all the 
population is granted equal access to health service, heavily relies on 
health financing methods, but not limited to political commitment and 
cultural aspect as well (Garrett, Chowdhury and Pablos-Mendez, 2009). 
According to Normand and Weber (2009), the four main principles on 
health financing methods are direct payment or out-of-pocket payment, 
commercial health insurance or private for-profit health insurance, 
government financing by general tax revenues and SHI.  
In fact, out-of-pocket payment accounts higher in low-income 
countries though, it limits certain group of population to access health 
service (Carrin, Xu and Evans, 2008) and risks people falling into further 
poverty and impoverishments (Garrett, Chowdhury and Pablos-Mendez, 
2009).  Thus, one of the objectives of UHC is to gradually minimize the 
use of out-of-pocket payment method by shifting it to prepayment 
method.   
Carrin and James (2005) elaborate on how government financing by 
general taxation revenues and SHI as the two principal methods of health 
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financing towards achieving UHC. General tax revenue is considered as 
the main source of health financing, combining the role between public 
networks and private providers. Whilst SHI aims to implement 
compulsory enrollment by paying contribution, covering all the 
population. Normand and Weber (2009) explain that SHI combines 
prepayment method and risk pooling, with mutual support. 
 Nevertheless due to the growing adoption of a global health 
objective in achieving health care for all, many governments encounter 
difficulties to maintain financial sustainability only through general 
taxation revenues, specifically in low-income developing countries. 
Hence it is common for countries to apply mixed health financing method 
of general tax revenue and SHI (Carrin and James, 2005). As a further 
matter, the central focus of this research is resting upon the concept of 
SHI towards UHC.  
A number on Member States posited a reform initiative on health 
financing methods during the fifty-eight World Health Assembly on 
Sustainable Health Financing, Universal Coverage and Social Health 
Insurance, by mixing of public and private approaches, including SHI 
method (WHO, 2005). WHO elaborates that there are seven main points 
of SHI method proposed by the Member States, such as the health-
financing system should include prepayment for financial contribution. 
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Second, ensuring an adequate and equal distribution of a good-quality 
health care both for the infrastructures and human resources in reference 
to the benefit package. Third, external funds should be managed and 
organized accordingly to support sustainability of health-financing 
system. Fourth is planning on achieving the target of UHC is crucial, with 
the objectives of improving health care quality, alleviating poverty and 
attaining international development goals. The fifth one is the process of 
transitioning from incomplete to UHC needs to be fit to the 
macroeconomics, socio-cultural and political context of each country. 
Sixth, the collaboration of public and private providers, together with 
health-financing organizations is mutual and beneficial under a strong 
government stewardship. And last point is sharing experience is expected 
on the development of various health financing methods.  
While Norman and Weber (2009) suggest that there are certain issues 
should be examined before a country decides to apply SHI as a financial 
tool to achieve UHC. This issues cover political aspect that lies on the 
idea on how the political situation affects the enrollment status of certain 
groups of the population in SHI, or if it is more feasible to have separate 
schemes for them. This issue is also related to different financial, 
territorial and ethnic considerations within one country. Second is the 
technical aspect. Unlike commercial insurances that apply risk-based 
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premium and qualifies the insured, SHI belongs to both groups of the 
population, consisting of ‘low-risk’ people and ‘high-risk’ people, by 
applying compulsory membership with premiums being based on wage-
related contributions, flat rate contributions or the mix from both 
contribution schemes. Third is equity which is considered as the 
transitional process to gradually extend the coverage by focusing on the 
status and ability of each person. The fourth aspect is the feasibility of 
universal coverage. This aspect deals with an assessment of timely 
process needed to include all the groups of workforce into the SHI 
scheme. The Fifth aspect is how the membership enrolment scheme 
should be conducted: voluntary or compulsory. They list that voluntary 
has more disadvantage than compulsory membership. The sixth aspect is 
to suggest that solution is to cover dependents by charging contribution 
for each family member, free of charge membership or providing 
subsidies for the family members. This last aspect, covering the informal 
sector, will be given below section. 
Norman and Weber (2009) elaborate several alternatives taken to 
include informal sector workers in a SHI scheme: 1. The preference is to 
choose more priority to compulsory contribution rather than voluntary 
contribution; 2. If the informal sector workers cannot afford to pay 
monthly contribution, SHI scheme should opt to apply flat-rate 
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contributions or even free membership; 3. At least the informal sector 
workers are able to access basic benefit package; 4. SHI scheme should be 
work together with the local communities and community-based 
organizations in order to have easier access to reach informal sector 
workers; 5. Combining a benefit package of SHI and other micro finance 
insurance; 6. Strengthening audit and control of small medium 
enterprises; 7. Conducting information-sharing across government 
agencies.   
In the context of Indonesia, SHI has been chosen to speed up the 
transition process from incomplete coverage to universal coverage. The 
fact that Indonesia targets to accomplish registering all the population into 
BPJS Kesehatan by 2019, Carrin and James (2005) propose that there are 
six ‘facilitating factors’ involved in speeding up the transition process. 
Thus in order to answer the research questions, this research grounds on 
the six ‘facilitating factors’ mentioned below: 
1. Level of income or general economic growth.  
Carrin and James (2005) posit an argument in which the ability 
of enterprises and citizens to provide prepayment contribution 
for SHI is determined by the level of income per capita.  
2. Structure of the economy. 
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This is related to the relative size of formal sector worker and 
informal sector worker. If the size of informal sector worker 
accounts larger than formal sector worker, the situation will 
affect the process of income assessment which is determined 
premiums or contributions. SHI is heavily relied on household 
contributions.  
3. Distribution of the population. 
The population in urban area has better access to acquire health 
care information, health care service and health care 
infrastructures. 
4. The country’s ability to administer. 
The business process of SHI scheme requires trained and skilled 
labor force. 
5. The level of solidarity within a society. 
When a country is able to define the level of solidarity within its 
society, most likely the process of cross-subsidy from the rich 
people to the poor people easier to get done. Cross-subsidy is 
crucial to provide sustainability towards SHI.  
6. Government’s stewardship. 
Government must provide legitimacy and transparency towards 
various stakeholders and population to have a voice in social 
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policymaking. Hence the government will gain trust from its 
citizen.  
 
3.2 Research Method and Data Collection 
 Aiming to answer the research questions, this research combines both 
quantitative and qualitative methodology in the analysis. Descriptive 
analysis focuses on trend of provision health expenditure, health care 
service, human resources and health care infrastructure in 33 provinces in 
Indonesia. The data is taken from the first law of SJSN was enacted, 2004 
to date. The qualitative method is heavily relied on theoretical and 
literature review of previous case study, institutional policies and 
objectives.  
This research conducts grey literature, within the five main websites: 
1. Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia; 2. Statistics Indonesia; 
3. ILO; 4. BPJS Kesehatan; 5. WHO. The secondary sources data is 
collected from statistics, reports on health and informal sector worker 
related policy, regulation, local healthcare schemes, and the road-map 









This chapter aims to analyze that six ‘facilitating factors’ that 
contribute to speed up transition in attaining Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC) through Social Health Insurance (SHI) in the context of Indonesia. 
Carrin and James (2005) posit the six ‘facilitating factors’ based on their 
research in eight countries (Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Germany, 
Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK) and Luxembourg). Those six 
‘facilitating factors’ are raging from macro to micro indicators of a 
country, as follows: 1). Level of income and economic growth; 2). 
Structure of the economy; 3). Distribution of the population; 4). Ability to 
administer, 5). Solidarity and 6). Government stewardship.  
By elaborating six ‘facilitating factors’ in the context of Indonesia, 
this research proposes to identify the challenges, encountered by the 
Government of Indonesia (GOI), the informal sector workers and the local 
government during the ongoing transition phase towards 2019. Carin and 
James (2005) define that the transition period as “the number of years 
between the first law related to health insurance and the final law voted to 
implement universal coverage”. However in the context of Indonesia, 
there is a slight difference. The reason for this that the first law was issued 
in 2004 (the law on National Social Security System or Sistem Jaminan 
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Sosial Nasional/SJSN Law) and the latest law in 2011 (the law on Social 
Security Administrative Body or Badan Pelaksana Jaminan Sosial/BPJS 
Law). However, the GOI did not implement any of those laws regulated. 
It was only on January 1, 2014 when BPJS Kesehatan started to operate to 
reach the goal of UHC in 2019.  
 
4.1. Level of Income and Economic Growth 
  
 The financial capacity of enterprises and citizens determines financial 
sustainability of SHI since they must pay premiums; either it is self-
funded by informal sector worker and their dependents or cost-sharing 
between the employer and employee. Any increase in per capita income is 
likely to affect the willingness of citizens to even prepay the SHI 
premium. Ideally the steady economic growth and tax revenue enables 
government to allocate more funding for subsidies to the targeted-
population. In fact, macro economic growth is not a sole reference to 
reflect a comprehensive growth or development in a country.  
At the time of the passing of the SJSN law passed in 2004, the 
economic growth of Indonesia started stabilizing in the aftermath of the 
Asia Financial Crisis (AFC). Even though the GDP per capita was USD 
1,148.569 and the GDP growth rate was 3.5 percent during the first year 
of the enforcement of the initial law related to national health care, the 
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GDP per capita progressively improved between the years of 2004 to 
2013. Meanwhile between the years of 2014 and 2015, the numbers 
slightly declined before it started to rise again in 2016.  
Depicting the timeline of the internal economy situation in Indonesia, 
between 2004 and 2010 was fluctuated due to the issue of the phasing out 
of fuel subsidies in Indonesia (Pradipto and Sahadewo, 2012). It has a 
binding instant impact on the industries and household consumption in 
Indonesia. Consequently, the GOI has to allocate budget to mitigate the 
impact from the fuel subsidy cut-off, mostly in the form of social 
assistance schemes. As defined by the Asian Development Bank (2005), it 
is a ‘public service obligation’ for the GOI to provide subsidized energy 
to the citizens specifically for electricity and other petroleum fuels to the 
present. 
Figure 1. Indonesia’s GDP Per Capita (Current US$): Year of 
2004-2016 
Source: The World Bank 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=ID 
Note: Author’s compilation 
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 Figure 2 increasing GDP growth rates during the period from 2004 to 
2016, with intermediate decline in 2009, 2014 and 2015. In 2008, the 
Global Financial Crisis occurred, inflicted economic crisis on Indonesia 
as well though the impact was not as bad as during the AFC.  
 




Source: The World Bank 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?end=2016&locations=
ID&start=1967&view=chart 
Note: Author’s compilation  
 
Although Indonesia enjoyed a continuous positive trend on economic 
growth post-AFC, the fact that it does not represent an overall 
measurement of all regional regions of Indonesia, namely it ignores 
regional disparities, is inevitable. Assessing the annual Gross Regional 
Domestic Product (GRDP) divided by the main/main group islands: 
Sumatera, Java, Bali and Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku 
and Papua, as seen in Figure 3, Java is still dominating, with 57.59 
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percent on average contribution of GRDP. It is followed by Sumatera 
(22.6 percent). As for the rest of the main islands, the annual contribution 
of GRDP to national GDP is less than 10 percent. This implies that the 
extreme gap of GRDP exists between Java and the other main/main group 
islands specifically the Eastern islands of Indonesia, such as Maluku and 
Papua (2.36 percent). The calculation of each presented main/main group 
islands is based on the annual contribution of GRDP to national GDP 
between 2011 and 2016 of the 34 provinces in Indonesia.  
Figure 3. Average Distribution of Gross Regional Domestic 
Product (%) in Indonesia by Main Islands 
 













4.2. Structure of the Economy 
 
The rising number of formal sector workers might be a positive 
indicator for the longevity of the SHI program specifically in a developing 
country, such as Indonesia. The situation facilitates the SHI management 
body, in this case BPJS Kesehatan, to perform better on controlling its 
membership administration and to get easier access to convey any 
updated information regarding the program. This is due to the fact that the 
institutions, companies or employers are considered to be the main pool in 
passing on information and to create a systematic and punctual payment 
flow. 
Even though in terms of sectors, the structure of the economy in 
Indonesia has been shifted from a primarily-agriculture based economy to 
manufacturing and services, and more recently to communication and 
transportation (Rothernberg, 2016 ;Yasir, 2017), on the one hand, in terms 
of the labor force, informal sector workers have been dominating the 
annual total number of the workforce. During the recovery period after  
the AFC in 2004, the informal sector workers accounted for 70 percent of 
the total workforce. Even though the number was declined slightly a year 
later, and became 69 percent, the condition remained static until 2010. 
Starting in 2011, the wide gap between informal sector workers and 
formal sector workers has been narrowed rapidly. (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Indonesia’s Percentage of Formal and Informal Sector 
Workers: Year of 2004-2016 
  





Note: Author’s calculation and compilation 
 
 
The head to head between Figure 6  and Figure 7 expounded that the 
biggest number of formal sector workers are in social services and 
individual proprietorship industries, while mostly informal sector workers 
still dominate agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishery industries. 
However, since the number of formal workers has been steadily 
escalating, this predicts the raising net income from informal sectors to 
formal sectors in which it had an effect on the premium scheme of the 
BPJS Kesehatan. This is because the calculation shows that BPJS 
Kesehatan benefits more from progressive premium rates (paid by formal 
workers) rather than flat premium rate (paid by informal workers and non-
employees).   
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Regarding the minimum wages, Indonesia sets different minimum 
wages within regional and provincial levels, known as Provincial 
Minimum Wage or Upah Minimum Provinsi (UPM). The background of 
this policy is due to the decentralization in 2001, and also considering the 
regional economic growth is different from one to another. The governor 
has full authorization to decide the set amount of UMP and to adjust the 
amount every year.  The regulation of UPM should be applied for formal 
and informal sector workers. In fact, the UPM is still leaving behind many 
informal sector workers who are still uncovered (Hohberg and Lay, 
2015).  
Referring to the data obtained from Statistics Indonesia per August 
2016 (GOI, 2017), the average of net income per month for worker in 
formal sector is 2,552,962 IDR (USD 192.2) and for informal sector 
worker is 1,496,430 IDR (USD 119.6). Table 6 delineates mining and 
quarrying industries offer the higher amount of salary, compared to other 
main industries due to the fact that the some of the biggest mining and 
quarrying companies in Indonesia are multinational companies. They 
usually provide better benefits as well. It indicates that the highly skilled-
workers are demanded to work in those companies. 
As for figure 5 below, the average numbers are based on annual 
regional and provincial minimum wages in Indonesia for each province 
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issued by Statistics Indonesia(c). This research processed the data from 
2004 to 2016. As it is presented, the highest average of minimum wages 
in Indonesia is in Kalimantan Utara (2,100,733 IDR or around 157.8 
USD). By contrast, Kalimantan Utara sets up pretty much higher 
minimum wages than DKI Jakarta, as the capital city. Whereas in terms of 






























Figure 5. Average Regional and Provincial Minimum Wages in 
Indonesia (in Indonesian Rupiah/IDR) 
 
 
Source: Statistics Indonesia (c) 
(https://www.bps.go.id/linkTableDinamis/view/id/917) 











Figure 6. Number of Formal Sector Workers in Indonesia by Main 
Industry:   
Year of 2017 
 
 























Figure 7. Number of Informal Sector Workers in Indonesia by Main 
Industry: Year of 2017 
 
 


























Table 1. Average of Net Salary per Month for the Formal  












Workers 3,680,086 11,611,892 4,812,360 3,698,625 3,773,788
Administrative	and	Managerial	
Workers 8,581,637 8,553,094 8,120,820 6,306,362 4,556,059
Clerical	and	Related	Workers 3,257,989 5,658,796 3,633,610 3,440,814 4,196,769
Sales	Workers 2,229,820 4,500,000 4,421,444 1,443,351 7,955,167






2,036,368 3,788,951 2,087,631 3,174,029 2,035,026





Source: Statistik Indonesia Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia (2017) 











4.3. Distribution of the Population 
 
 Urban areas are apt to provide better access and better service to 
health care. Urbanization with its vast development of infrastructure, the 
advancement of communication and population density produces more 
efficiency in administrative cost for SHI program compared to dispersed 
rural areas (Carrin and James, 2005). Although Indonesia’s urban 
population is one of the highest in Asia, with more than 50 percent of the 
total population (Lewis, 2014), particular geographical features of some 
areas remain a challenge for the GOI. As for some areas with arduous 
access, the condition delays the improvement of infrastructure, hinders the 
distribution of essential goods (e.g. electricity) and provision of 
information (e.g. government’s programs).  
The GOI has projected the growth of the urban population in each 
province for every five year period the timespan of 2010 to 2035. Thus 
according to the 2010-2015 urbanization projection, as shown in Table 7, 
the average rate of the urban population is expected to reach 56.7 percent 
by 2020, a year after the target of UHC in 2019. However the Table 7 and 
Figure 7 suggests a typical yet critical issue in Indonesia: immense gap 
among provinces. Provinces such as Sulawesi Barat (23.0 percent), Nusa 
Tenggara Timur (26.3 percent), Maluku Utara (28.9 percent) are among 
the low-rate urbanization growth.  
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It is clearly relatable to Figure 6 that pronounces the number of 
districts categorized as ‘Daerah Tertinggal’ or ‘Disadvantaged Regions’ 
by main islands in Indonesia. The term ‘Disadvantaged Regions’ derives 
from the Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia No. 131/2015 
on Penetapan Daerah Tertinggal Tahun 2015-2019. The definition of 
‘Disadvantaged Regions’ refers to 122 districts that are still less 
developed or underdeveloped than other districts. The classification of 
‘Disadvantaged Regions’ is appertained to the criteria of local economic 
activities, human resources, infrastructure, regional financial ability 
accessibility and characteristics of the districts. The list of districts is 
subject to change every five years. According to the Figure 6, mainly the 
Eastern regions of Indonesia appear on the list.  
Figure 8. Number of ‘Disadvantaged Regions’ in Indonesia by 
Main Islands: Year of 2015-2019 
 
Source: Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia 




Table 2. Urban Population (in %) in Indonesia by Provinces: 2010-2035 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Province	 2010	 2015	 2020	 2025	 2030	 2035	
Aceh	 28.1	 30.5	 33.2	 36.2	 39.5	 43.2	
Sumatera	Utara	 49.2	 52.6	 56.3	 60.1	 64.1	 68.1	
Sumatera	Barat	 38.7	 44.2	 49.6	 54.6	 59.4	 63.8	
Riau	 39.2	 39.6	 40.1	 40.7	 41.2	 41.8	
Jambi	 30.7	 32.0	 33.3	 34.8	 36.5	 38.2	
Sumatera	Selatan	 35.8	 36.5	 37.3	 38.2	 39.1	 40.1	
Bengkulu	 31.0	 31.7	 32.6	 33.5	 34.5	 35.6	
Lampung	 25.7	 28.3	 31.3	 34.6	 38.3	 42.4	
Kepulauan	Bangka	Belitung	 49.2	 52.5	 56.0	 59.7	 63.5	 67.4	
Kepulauan	Riau	 82.8	 83.0	 83.3	 83.8	 84.5	 85.3	
DKI	Jakarta	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	
Jawa	Barat	 65.7	 72.9	 78.7	 83.1	 86.6	 89.3	
Jawa	Tengah	 45.7	 48.4	 51.3	 54.3	 57.5	 60.8	
DI	Yogyakarta	 66.4	 70.5	 74.6	 78.0	 81.3	 84.1	
Jawa	Timur	 47.6	 51.1	 54.7	 58.6	 62.6	 66.7	
Banten	 67.0	 67.7	 69.9	 73.7	 78.8	 84.9	
Bali	 60.2	 65.5	 70.2	 74.3	 77.8	 81.2	
Nusa	Tenggara	Barat	 41.7	 45.4	 49.4	 53.6	 58.1	 62.7	
Nusa	Tenggara	Timur	 19.3	 21.6	 24.3	 27.3	 30.7	 34.6	
Kalimantan	Barat	 30.2	 33.1	 36.2	 39.8	 43.7	 47.9	
Kalimantan	Tengah	 33.5	 36.6	 40.2	 44.1	 48.3	 52.9	
Kalimantan	Selatan	 42.1	 45.1	 48.4	 52.0	 55.8	 59.8	
Kalimantan	Timur	 63.2	 66.0	 68.9	 71.8	 74.8	 77.7	
Sulawesi	Utara	 45.2	 49.8	 54.7	 59.2	 63.9	 68.7	
Sulawesi	Tengah	 24.3	 27.2	 30.5	 34.2	 38.4	 43.1	
Sulawesi	Selatan	 36.7	 40.6	 45.0	 49.8	 54.9	 59.6	
Sulawesi	Tenggara	 27.4	 31.2	 35.0	 39.4	 43.6	 48.3	
Gorontalo	 34.0	 39.0	 44.0	 48.9	 53.5	 58.4	
Sulawesi	Barat	 22.9	 22.9	 23.0	 23.0	 23.1	 23.1	
Maluku	 37.1	 38.0	 38.9	 39.9	 41.0	 42.1	
Maluku	Utara	 27.1	 27.8	 28.5	 29.2	 29.9	 30.6	
Papua	Barat	 29.9	 32.3	 34.9	 37.8	 40.9	 44.4	
Papua	 26.0	 28.4	 31.2	 34.2	 37.7	 41.5	
INDONESIA	 49.8	 53.3	 56.7	 60.0	 63.4	 66.6	
Source: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Badan Pusat Statistik and 
United Nations Population Fund 
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Figure 9. Average Growth Rate of Urban Population (in %) in 
Indonesia by Provinces 
	
Source: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Badan Pusat Statistik and 
United Nations Population Fund 
Note: Author’s calculation and compilation 
 
 
4.4. Ability to Administer 
 
This factor evolves to an administrative aspect proposed by Carrin 
and James (2005) about the availability of skilled-manpower specifically 
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in bookkeeping, banking and information processing to manage the 
business process and strengthen the sustainability of the SHI program. 
Meanwhile, in the case of Indonesia, the aforementioned factor should be 
considered as secondary aspects rather than an aspect of building trust 
between the management of SHI program (BPJS Kesehatan) and its 
participants (Bärnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002). Thus they also 
elaborate German started from “small, informal, voluntary health 
insurance schemes may serve as learning models for fund administration 
and solidarity, both of which will make introduction of larger, more 
formal, compulsory schemes an easier task.” (Bärnighausen and 
Sauerborn, 2002). By contrast, the ability to administer in the case of 
Indonesia is broader from what Carrin and James (2005) proposed, not 
only the skilled-manpower but also the institution itself.  
Formal social protection programs in Indonesia were run by four 
state-owned enterprises prior to BPJS Kesehatan. BPJS Kesehatan was 
introduced as a part of the main agenda of Indonesia’s social protection 
transformation. The transformation refers to the shifting assets, liabilities 
and management staffs from PT. ASKES Indonesia (Persero) to BPJS 
Kesehatan. PT. ASKES Indonesia (Persero) was one of the state-owned 
enterprises that managed health care funds only for the civil servants, i.e. 
about 7 percent of the total population by the end of 2013. This indicates 
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that the former state-owned enterprises managed very small population. 
Moreover the employee who worked for the former state-owned 
enterprises were categorized as public civil servants. It means that the 
recruitment process and the management of employee referred to the 
standard of public civil servant.  
By contrast,  BPJS Kesehatan is considered as the sole public entity 
who has authority to manage all the implementation of the health care 
system in Indonesia, nationally. Even though it is a centralized health care 
system, the fact that it is still fragmented in terms of the health care 
facility procedure because based on the area where the person lives has 
cause more complex.  
Aside being transformed from PT. ASKES Indonesia (Persero), the 
Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia already handed over the 
management of JAMKESMAS, the subsidized-health insurance for the 
poor and near-poor people to BPJS Kesehatan. It assumes that the scope 
of tasks has been broaden for the fund administration.  
 
4.5. Solidarity 
 Solidarity refers to the concept of performing cross-subsidization 
between the poor and the rich and the high-risk and low-risk groups, as it 
is proposed by Carrin and James (2005) and WHO (2010). On another 
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note, the concept of solidarity here as applying cross-subsidization might 
create friction specifically between the high-risk and low-risk group. Due 
to the reason that high-risk group is the people who prone to catastrophic 
diseases hence, they most likely use the high-cost health care treatments 
in the regular basis.  
The concept of UHC should not be defined as one-size-fits-all on 
health care systems and health care provisions although the sole purpose 
is the equality to access health care service without risking them 
financially (WHO, 2010). It is because UHC should reflect and prioritize 
the needs of a nation despite its initiation and purpose led by the global 
health community (George, 2016). By responding to the needs of its 
population, a government initiates solidarity within the society.  
The GOI bears the premium expense of BPJS Kesehatan for the poor 
and the near-poor population. On a different note, the premium for the 
poor and the near-poor people is considered too low, 1.7 USD. Since the 
amount is compared to the estimation of the standard of basic care service 
by the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 34 USD (WHO, 
2010). Figure 9 displays a declining trend of the poor population in 
Indonesia, despite the fact exhibited by Figure 10, that the poor and the 
near-poor people dominate about 60 percent of recent total membership 
enrollment status for BPJS Kesehatan. This situation contributes to the 
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less income of BPJS Kesehatan. Whereas the GOI already raised the 
premium scheme for the informal sector workers or non-employees since 
April 2016.  
JKN requires a referral system in using health care facilities. 
According to the regulation in which members must visit the first 
classification of health care facilities, consisting of Pusat Kesehatan 
Masyarakat (Puskemas), Poliklinik, dentists or 24 hour clinic/family 
clinics. Public hospitals, private hospitals and specialist doctors are 
classified as ‘referred health care facilities’. The numbers of Puskesmas, 
Poliklinik and clinic are sufficient to reach almost all the areas of 
Indonesia, unlike hospitals that are mostly located in the provincial 
capitals. Related to user fee, Puskesmas, Poliklink and clinic are more 
affordable (about 1-2 USD), than hospitals or specialist doctor. Hence 
regardless the monthly premium of BPJS Kesehatan, the referral system 








Figure 10. Percentage of the Poor Population in Indonesia by Urban 
and Rural Areas 
 
 
Source: Statistic Indonesia (d) (https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1494) 
Note: Author’s calculation and compilation 
 
 
Figure 11. Percentage of Poor the Population in Indonesia by Years 
 
Source: Statistics Indonesia (d) 
(https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1494) 
Note: Author’s calculation and compilation 
 
4.6. Government Stewardship  
In the case of Indonesia, government stewardship possibly turns out 
to be a critical yet most crucial issue. Since the role of the government is 
to be the main actor to lead, to ensure and to secure social welfare 
programs for all the citizen, t This implies that the government’s 
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transparency is often challenged in order to earn trust from the citizens. 
By paying premiums, citizen contributes to preserve the continuity of the 
SHI program.  
Thus, the mutual interest between the GOI and the citizens 
determines the sustainability of BPJS Kesehatan. On a different note, 
Kusnali, Laksmiarti and Effendi (2017) cluster conflicts, involving BPJS 
Kesehatan, citizens and healthcare facilities, based on ‘complaints’ and 
‘other than complaints’. ‘Complaints’ refer to conflict or disputes 
occurring within the scope of handling complaints division of BPJS 
Kesehatan. ‘Other than conflicts’ often occurs due to the contractual cases 
or illegal issues. Consequently, they strongly suggest the GOI to establish 
an independent institution that solely focuses yet remain neutral to any 
potential conflicts or disputes (Kusnali, Laksmiarti and Effendi, 2017).  
The ongoing precarious issue is the growing budget deficit of BPJS 
Kesehatan since its first year implementation in 2014. The root of the 
problem is the imbalance between the low premiums option and broad 
medical coverage (Rachman, 2015). The latest update mentioned that 
BPJS Kesehatan has been suffering from a budget deficit which has 
already reached 9.7 trillion IDR (728.23 million USD) in 2016 (Jakarta 
Globe, 2017).  
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As for the current status of membership enrollment, 183,579,086 
residents of Indonesia already registered by November 1, 2017.  Figure 10 
distributes the numbers for each group of the population. Therefore 
approximately 71 percent of the total population are already covered by 
JKN. Even so based on the data by the Ministry of Health of the Republic 
of Indonesia (2013), the population covered by health insurance in 2013, a 
year before BPJS Kesehatan was introduced in the beginning of 2014, 
was 76,18 percent of the total population 111,593,654. 
Figure 12. BPJS Membership Status per November 1, 2017 
Source: BPJS Kesehatan 












CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5.1. Summary of Findings 
The historical background of social protection development in 
Indonesia describes an inactive motion on formal social protection 
provisions and it was heavily relied on informal social protection 
arrangements prior to the National Social Security System (JKN) in 2004. 
One of the arguments is due to the ‘Indonesia’s welfare regime change’ 
correlates with the economy and political-economic reform that is 
described into three major period: (1) Old Order regime (1945-1966); (2) 
New Order regime (1966-1998); (3) Post-AFC from 1997-1998 to the 
present (Sumarto, 2017). This research also recounts the historical 
background of the social protection development with a particular form 
on health care during the aforementioned periods.  
Formal social protection refers to social protection programs that 
exclusively target certain group of population, such as workers in public 
and private sectors. Formal social protection programs were introduced 
during the Old Order regime (1945-1967) and Soekarno was the president 
during the period. However the program did not well-developed because 
the GOI allocated most of the national budget to build and restore the 
country from the war-torn situation. Second big portion of the national 
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budget went to military-related purposes since after the Proclamation of 
Indonesian Independence in 1945, Indonesia was struggling from other 
countries invasions for few years after that (Sumarto, 2017; Booth, 2010). 
Indonesia entered its miraculous economic transformation from the late 
1960s to the early 1970s under the presidency of Soeharto, known as the 
New Order regime (1966-1998). This is the period of ‘Oil Boom’ 
provided Indonesia with abundance of not only oil but also other minerals 
wealth. One of the crucial economic policies by Soeharto in the early 
years of his tenure was to open foreign investment to boost Indonesia’s 
economic development and Indonesia’s rapid industrialization. As the 
result, the job openings were expanded and labor force participation rate 
increased. The increasing rate of labor force participation affected the 
enhancement of formal social protection programs as well. Even though it 
was not significant. The period marked as the beginning of hefty oil 
subsidies that is enjoyed by most of the Indonesia population. The oil 
subsidies issue is always be the main focus and main concern of the 
nation, at least to the present day. Thus the issue on oil subsidies is one of 
the main factors why the formal social protection programs have been 
slow developed.  
By contrast, informal social protection was and still usually initiated 
as part of family-based and community-based social protection programs 
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that strongly rooted in Indonesian society. The fundamental philosophy 
derives from the term of ‘Gotong royong’, a Javanese phrase that means 
“several people carrying something together” (Bowen, 1986 in Sumarto, 
2017). Gotong royong is widely acceptable and applicable social 
protection provision in Indonesia more than formal social protection 
provision. Sumarto (2017) also emphasizes that how the role of Gotong 
royong in providing social protection for its community members covers 
almost all the aspects, such as: (1). Gotong royong as multi-purpose 
insurance, also known as ‘Arisan’; (2). Gotong royong as sickness 
insurance; (3). Gotong royong as healthcare; (3). Gotong royong as death 
insurance; (4). Gotong royong as income maintenance; (4). Gotong 
royong for housing; (5). Gotong royong as food security; (6). Gotong-
royong as neighborhood security. Even though the informal social 
protection has been dominantly occupying the coverage needs of 
Indonesian population, in fact, it was unable to protect them from the 
aftermath of major crisis, such the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997-
1998 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008. Those major financial 
crises specifically the AFC have been marked as a critical juncture in the 
transformation of social protection provision in Indonesia.  
It was during Megawati Sukarnoputri’s presidential term in 2004, the 
law on National Social Security System or Sistem Jaminan Sosial 
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Nasional (SJSN) was enacted. The law regulates that the fragmented 
social protection programs in health care and employment run by four 
state-owned enterprises: (1). PT. ASKES; (2). PT. JAMSOSTEK; (3). PT. 
TASPEN; (4). PT. ASABRI must be converted into a single public entity, 
named Social Security Administrative Body or Badan Penyelenggara 
Jaminan Sosial (BPJS). BPJS manages health care program (BPJS 
Kesehatan) and employment program (BPJS Ketenagakerjaan). The 
health care program run by BPJS Kesehatan is nationally known as 
National Health Insurance or Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN). The 
health care program is the sole focus of this research.  
The background of this research derives from a very ambitious goal 
of the GOI to achieve a newly-adop‘health for all’ or UHC within five 
years, from 2014 to 2019.  In fact, covering such large number of people 
does pose many challenges due to the strong decentralization and 
structure of economic diversity of Indonesia.  At present, BPJS Kesehatan 
is the largest single health insurance payer.  
 Indonesia, the largest archipelago country in the world with more 
than 250 million inhabitants occupies different regional and time zones 
and has been actively adjusting to a newly-adopted health care scheme, 
‘health for all’, via the compulsory membership and contribution of SHI 
since 2014. The program is nationally known as National Health 
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Insurance (JKN) with a single public entity body as the health care fund 
management, name Social Security Administrative Body (BPJS 
Kesehatan).  
 Decentralization policy has been moving authority from the central 
government to local governments to establish their own health care 
policy. This is supposed to reflect the its citizens’ needs priority within 
the boundaries of their respective financial ability and budget allocation at 
the local government level. As a result, prior to the passing of the SJSN 
Law in 2004 and between the years from 2001 to 2012, more than 350 
districts/cities already funded, designed, established and managed their 
own Regional Health Insurance (JAMKESDA) schemes. This indicates 
that the local government already was already aware of UHC scheme 
even before the central government initiated JKN as a national program.  
 Meanwhile, when the GOI finally enacted the SJSN Law, one of the 
main considerations was to provide social protection for employees who 
work in informal sector. By 2004, the gap between formal sector worker 
and informal sector workers was very large, with the informal sector 
workers constituting more than 65 percent of the total number of the labor 
force. However, the task of JKN, the centralized health care system, 
remains challenging to reach since the informal sector workers mostly 
work in the dispersed rural areas. In addition, most of them work in 
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traditional industries, such as agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishery, 
which poses various challenges to reaching them from an administrative 
point of view. Moreover, Indonesia has made efforts to establish an 
integrated single citizen database system, yet the  e-KTP (national 
identification registration), as the pilot project,  has been struggling with 
corruption case.  
 For theoretical framework and research methodology, this research 
was conducted to identify the potential challenges faced by the GOI, with 
regard to informal sector workers and regarding the activities of the local 
government in responding to the goal of UHC by 2019. This research uses 
the six ‘facilitating factors’ that are elaborated by Carrin and James 
(2005). They argue that the six ‘facilitating factors’ has been the key 
factors to speed up UHC through SHI, based on their comparative 
research of eight countries that already reached health care universalism 
(Carrin and James, 2005). This research is primarily applied grey 
literature and secondary source data.  
  
5.2. The Challenges of the GOI, Informal Sector Workers and the 
Local Government 
During the nascent phase of health care reform in Indonesia, the 
mounting deficit of the BPJS Kesehatan was the biggest concern. The 
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implication is potentially creating a domino effect among all the 
stakeholders: (1) BPJS Kesehatan-health care facilities; (2) Health care 
facilities-BPJS Kesehatan beneficiaries; (3) BPJS Kesehatan-its 
beneficiaries. Tracing the root of the problem, about 60 percent of total 
membership is made up of poor and near-poor people who are fully 
subsidized by the GOI, with the low amount of monthly premium of 1.7 
USD per person. Whereas the broad spectrum of medical services and 
treatment have been applied for all the members of BPJS Kesehatan.  
This indicates that raising resource funding is indispensable yet 
challenging for the GOI, although since April 1, 2016, the premium of 
informal sector workers and non-employees already partially adjusted to 
be higher than the previous initial premium. It is challenging because the 
GOI should not impose more burden on the national budget. Otherwise 
the National Health Insurance or Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) 
only performs similarity to the previous poverty alleviation programs, 
subsidized programs or social assistance programs rather than as SHI 
scheme.  
Due to the new centralized health care system, the GOI should be 
more proactive to reach out to all sections of the population, including 
indigenous peoples.  Reaching out to the informal sector workers in 
dispersed rural areas is still the major challenge because the high number 
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of informal sector workers in industries such as agriculture, forestry, 
hunting and fishery remaining a major challenge. The challenges can be 
addressed by strengthening and improving coordination and corporation 
with the local governments 
The growing numbers of membership enrollment should be 
accompanied by expansion of health care facilities. Thus, the ideal ratio 
between beneficiaries and health care facilities are fulfilled.  
 
5.3 Recommendations 
Despite the ongoing discussion between the GOI and the related 
Ministries/Institutions regarding the mounting deficit of BPJS Kesehatan, 
raising the premium of BPJS Kesehatan should be the most crucial 
solution to be considered. The situation is pretty urgent in order to sustain 
the program for the long run. Otherwise JKN program will only impose 
burden to the government budget specifically to the central government, 
similarly to the ongoing issue of oil and subsidies. Furthermore, the 
objective of implementing health insurance should be exposed to the 
citizen of Indonesia. Considering that almost all the Indonesian 
population is more familiar with the informal social protection provision 
rather than formal social protection provision. Thus building the trust 
between the GOI along with all the related stakeholders of this national 
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program and the citizen is the essential key. For another proposed-
solution, allocating budget from tobacco taxation is supplementary.  
Moreover the referral system of BPJS Kesehatan does not really 
reflect how the national health care system should be applied. It indicates 
that the system should be nationally integrated so that all the population is 
able to access all the health care facilities regardless their residential 
region or area and without complex bureaucracy as well. Universalism in 
health care also means equal development and distribution of health care 
facilities, health care infrastructures and health care practitioners such as 
doctors, nurses etc.  
Taking the definition that UHC is not a one-size-fits-all scheme is 
closer to describing the diversity of existing regional health care schemes 
and programs (JAMKESDA) in Indonesia. Due to this reason, a 
centralized health care program should consider adjusting the needs of 
local governments and the population within the area of jurisdiction. This 
is not only going to support the efficiency of national budgets but also the 
effectiveness of the JKN.  
As for the immediate integration process from diverse regional health 
care schemes and programs of provincial and district/city level to JKN, it 
should be an incremental process, since some JAMKESDA schemes are 
already more mature than JKN. Once the integrated database of the 
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population is already well-established, centralized health care systems 
will be a lot easier to implement. Decentralized health care systems under 
centralized health care management might then be one of the policy-
making options.  
The goal of the UHC should not be limited to how fast all the 
population is covered by the program or the scheme, but, should also the 
readiness of health care infrastructures and human resources to provide 
health care equality. Most importantly is to raise the resource funding and 
this supposedly be done by the central government and the local 
government or by cross-subsidization between public and private sectors. 
After that the central government and local government should divide 
clear authority and clear tasks regarding the program, the integration of 
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중앙정부, 지방정부 및 비공식 노동자들이 직면한 과제들 
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본 연구의 목적은 모두에게 건강을 의료제도, 즉 
국민의료보장제도 (Universal Health Coverage)를 새로이 도입함에 
있어 인도네시아 중앙정부, 지방정부와 비공식 노동자들이 직면할 
만한 잠재적 과제들을 파악하기 위함에 있다. 해당 의료제도는 네 
개의 공기업 및 지방 정부들 사이에 분산 운영되던 기존의 공식 
사회보호 프로그램들을 통합한 단일 전국민의료제도이다. 
전국민의료보험 또는 JKN (Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional)이라 
명명된 이 제도의 도입은 사회건강보험공단인 BPJS Kesehatan 
(Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial)이라는 공공기관에서 단독 
주관하게 되었다. JKN이 이미 세운 목표는 2014년부터 2019년까지 
5년 이내에 인도네시아 인구 전체를 대상으로 사회의료보험(Social 
Health Insurance)를 통해 의료 보편주의를 실현하겠다는 것이다. 
인도네시아가 세계에서 네번째로 인구가 많은 나라이자 가장 큰 
섬나라이며 분권화 성향이 뚜렷한 가운데 비공식 노동자들이 압도적 
다수를 차지하는 나라라는 점을 감안하면 상당히 야심찬 목표이다. 
JKN이 도입되기 이전부터 인도네시아가 실시해온 지방분권화 
정책은 지역 차원에서 의료보장제도를 다양하게 보완해왔다. 따라서 
지방정부들이 각자 발전시켜온 JAMKESDA (Jaminan Kesehatan 
Daerah), 즉 지역건강보험을 JKN에 마지못해 통합시키는 과정에서 
몇몇 지방 정부들은 인도네시아 중앙정부와 갈등을 겪게 되었다. 
JKN은 사회의료보험을 통해 자금을 충당하는데 이는 인도네시아의 
모든 국민이 개개인의 소득수준에 기초해 의무적으로 가입하고 
분담금을 납부하도록 되어있다. 이는 인도네시아의 전체노동인구 중 
압도적 비중을 차지하는 비공식 노동자들, 즉 농업, 어업, 수렵, 임업에 
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주로 종사하는 비공식 노동자들로 하여금 난제에 봉착하게끔 만들고 
있다. 
이러한 잠재적 난제들을 파악하기 위해 본 연구는 카렝과 제임스 
(2005)가 제시한 여섯 가지 촉진요인들에 기반해 분석을 실시했다. 
카렝과 제임스의 주장에 따르면 이 여섯 가지 촉진요인들은 
사회의료보험을 통해 JKN 의 이행을 가속화 시키는데 있어 
핵심적이다. 이 요인들을 인도네시아의 상황에 적용해 분석한 결과, 
매년 증가하는 인도네시아 건강보험공단의 적자와 같은 문제들을 
해결하기 위해 가장 중요한 요인은 정부의 책임의식 (government 
stewardship)임이 밝혀졌다. 따라서 본 연구를 발전시켜 
JAMKESDA 가 JKN 에 통합되는 과정에 초점을 맞춘 연구가 향후 
이뤄지기를 기대해 본다. 
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